From 99a5321aab580b2caa62559d3b6c016ccf15eb70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joey Hess Date: Sat, 11 Mar 2017 11:34:46 -0400 Subject: idea from Thomas S --- TODO | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/TODO b/TODO index 7b56c90..5ddc006 100644 --- a/TODO +++ b/TODO @@ -98,3 +98,13 @@ Encryption tunables changes: disaster. HKDF may prove more robust in the face of partial SHA-2 breaks. Deferred for now until tthere's some other reason to change keysafe's tunables. +* Thomas S points out that All-Or-Nothing Transform could be used to + prevent recovery of a partial key, when not all chunks are available to + an attacker. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All-or-nothing_transform + For this to add security, there would need to be enough storage locations + that they can be partitioned into at least three sets, with the chunks split + amoung the three. One chunk probably contains the actual private + key material, a second signatures and other cruft, and the last chunk + would contain the AONT key. This would require all three sets of servers + to combine their material to crack the key. It would then make sense to + chunk even small keys. -- cgit v1.2.3