Soon:

* Get some keysafe servers set up.
* Set up --check-servers in a cron job, so I know when servers are down.

Later:

* The attack cost display can lead to a false sense of security if the user
  takes it as gospel. It needs to be clear that it's an estimate. This and
  other parts of the keysafe UI need usability testing.
* improve restore progress bar points (update after every hash try)
* If we retrieved enough shares successfully, but decrypt failed, must
  be a wrong password, so prompt for re-entry and retry with those shares.
* --no-jargon which makes the UI avoid terms like "secret key" and "crack
  password". Do usability testing!
* --key-value=$N which eliminates the question about password value,
  and rejects passwords that would cost less than $N to crack at current
  rates. This should add a combo box to the password entry form in the
  GUI to let the user adjust the $N there.
* In backup, only upload to N-1 servers immediately, and delay the rest
  for up to several days, with some uploads of chaff, to prevent
  collaborating evil servers from correlating related shards.
* Add some random padding to http requests and responses, to make it
  harder for traffic analysis to tell that given TOR traffic is
  keysafe traffic.

Wishlist:

* Keep secret keys in locked memory until they're encrypted.
  (Raaz makes this possible to do.)
  Would be nice, but not super-important, since gpg secret keys
  are passphrase protected anyway..
* Don't require --totalshares and --neededshares on restore when unusual
  values were used for backup. 
  The difficulty is that the number of needed shares cannot be determined by
  looking at shares, and guessing it wrong will result in combining
  too few shares yielding garbage, which it will take up to an hour to
  try to decrypt, before it can tell that more shares are needed.
  This could be dealt with by including the number of needed shares in the
  serialization of Share, but then an attacker could use it to partition
  shares from servers. If only one person uses --neededshares=5,
  the attacker can guess that all their shares go together.