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| author | Joey Hess <joeyh@joeyh.name> | 2017-04-29 14:46:45 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Joey Hess <joeyh@joeyh.name> | 2017-04-29 14:51:26 -0400 |
| commit | a61df1522ddf8a36839cf1180d3b16e354459e9a (patch) | |
| tree | 0e78f72714701b8cd7f32591c921e4826fcf1ddd /TODO | |
| parent | 237b94f6c687675215f78fba28d7e003a2b9ab7d (diff) | |
| download | debug-me-a61df1522ddf8a36839cf1180d3b16e354459e9a.tar.gz | |
user gpg key checking and prompting done!
Diffstat (limited to 'TODO')
| -rw-r--r-- | TODO | 7 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 4 deletions
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ +* When user rejects developer, the debug-me --debug prints + "User did not grant access to their terminal." and says the session + log is done, but keeps running. * GPG WoT is checked by querying pgp.cs.uu.nl, could use wotsap if it's locally installed. However, the version of wotsap in debian only supports short, insecure keyids, so is less secure than using the server. @@ -43,10 +46,6 @@ * Add a mode that, given a log file, displays what developer(s) gpg keys signed activity in the log file. For use when a developer did something wrong, to examine the proof of malfesence. -* gpg key downloading, web of trust checking, prompting - Alternatively, let debug-me be started with a gpg key, - this way a project's website can instruct their users to - "run debug-me --trust-gpg-key=whatever" * How to prevent abusing servers to store large quantities of data that are not legitimate debug-me logs, but are formatted like them? Perhaps add POW to the wire protocol? Capthca? |