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authorJoey Hess <joeyh@joeyh.name>2016-10-23 17:32:56 -0400
committerJoey Hess <joeyh@joeyh.name>2016-10-23 17:32:56 -0400
commit469fc609f22c88928241474ab456eb81cb163edc (patch)
tree409594e2b912b5e137935e6f3cb782e262a7952b
parent2020ccc3ffbbc8a255c9e4e043167786124be2cf (diff)
downloadkeysafe-469fc609f22c88928241474ab456eb81cb163edc.tar.gz
update
-rw-r--r--TODO16
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/TODO b/TODO
index 97da3e0..2c5c26f 100644
--- a/TODO
+++ b/TODO
@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@ Later:
harder for traffic analysis to tell that given TOR traffic is
keysafe traffic.
* Argon2d is more resistent to GPU/ASIC attack optimisation.
- Switching from Argon2i would require new tunables, so deferred for now
+ Switching from Argon2i would require new tunables, and delay restores
+ (of keys backed up using the old tunables, and when the user provides the
+ wrong name) by ~10 minutes, so deferred for now
until there's some other reason to change the tunables.
Wishlist:
@@ -51,4 +53,14 @@ Wishlist:
with 2 shares, then 3, etc, and once it found shares, it would know the
number needed. It should also be possible to avoid breaking backwards
compatability, by only including the number of shares in the name when
- it's not the standard number.
+ it's not the standard number. To avoid needing to re-run argon2 for each
+ try, the argon2 hash of the name could be calculated first, and then the
+ number of needed shares appended before the final sha256 hash is
+ generated.
+
+ If an attacker is able to guess the name, and a nonstandard number of
+ shares was used, the attacker could upload other objects where they would
+ be found before the real objects. This could be used to prevent
+ restore from working. (It also makes a malicious data attack (as described
+ in https://joeyh.name/keysafe/details/) possible by attackers who do not
+ control the servers.