| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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all messages to the console.
This should protect against all attacks where the server sends back a
malicious message.
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Allow deserializing SecretKeySource so we can later know what gpg keys are
backed up.
Converted KeyId to Text as JSON can't handle ByteString.
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The server has to run the hash once to verify a request, so a hash that
took 4 seconds could make the server do too much work if it's being flooded
with requests.
So, made the hash much less expensive.
This required keeping track of fractional seconds. Actually, I used
Rational for them, to avoid most rounding problems. That turned out nice.
I've only tuned the proofOfWorkHashTunable on my fanless overheating
laptop so far. It seems to be fairly reasonablly tuned though.
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Mashed up a argon2-based PoW with token buckets and bloom filters.
This is intended to prevent a few abuses including:
* Using a keysafe server for general file storage, by storing a whole
lot of chunks.
* An attacker guessing names that people will use, and uploading junk
to keysafe servers under those names, to make it harder for others to use
keysafe later.
* An attacker trying to guess the names used for objects on keysafe
servers in order to download them and start password cracking.
(As a second level of defense, since the name generation hash
is expensive already.)
Completely untested, but it builds!
This commit was sponsored by Andreas on Patreon.
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